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Essays in Applied Microeconomics
Lesley J. Turner
In the United States, like many developed countries, gov-
ernment provides substantial support for primary, secondary, 
and postsecondary education. In 2011, expenditures on edu-
cation are expected to equal 7.6 percent of GDP (National 
Center for Education Statistics
2011). At the postsecondary level, federal grants and 
loans for college students aim to ameliorate credit market 
imperfections. Publicly provided K–12 education insures 
universal access to human capital development for all 
children. The three essays that make up this dissertation 
broadly focus on the role government should play in financ-
ing and providing education.
Chapter 1
The Incidence of Student Financial Aid: 
Evidence from the Pell Grant Program
The first chapter estimates the economic incidence of 
need-based student aid. The federal Pell Grant program 
provides billions of dollars in subsidies to low-income col-
lege students to increase affordability and access to higher 
education. Although students are the statutory recipients of 
this aid, its economic incidence may fall partially on schools 
(Fullerton and Metcalf
2002). Specifically, schools may strategically increase 
recipients’ effective prices, crowding out federal aid by 
reducing discounts provided through institutional aid. 
Concurrent tuition and student aid increases combined with 
substantial growth in the for-profit sector of higher education 
underscore the importance of evaluating federal aid crowd 
out.
Using regression discontinuity (RD) and regression kink 
(RK) designs (Angrist and Lavy 1999; Card, Lee, and Pei 
2009; Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klauuw 2001;; Nielsen, 
Sørenson, and Taber 2010) and detailed student-level data 
from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, I show 
that 16 percent of all Pell Grant aid is passed through from 
students to schools in the form of higher effective prices. In 
2011, the federal government distributed $35 billion in Pell 
Grants to 9.5 million students. My results suggest that insti-
tutions captured $6 billion of this aid.
My identification strategy takes advantage of nonlineari-
ties in the relationship between Pell Grant aid and the federal 
government’s measure of need, which lead to discontinu-
ous changes in both the level and the slope of the program’s 
schedule. RK and RD designs yield conflicting estimates of 
the impact of Pell Grant aid on college pricing, with RK 
estimates suggesting that schools capture Pell Grant aid and 
RD estimates implying that schools supplement Pell Grants 
with increased institutional aid. I reconcile these disparate 
estimates using a framework in which the “treatment” of Pell 
Grant receipt is multidimensional. Specifically, students at 
the margin of Pell Grant eligibility receive an extra dollar of 
outside aid but are also given the label of being a Pell Grant 
recipient, which may change some institutions’ willingness 
to direct resources toward them.
I develop a combined RD/RK approach to separately 
identify schools’ willingness to pay for students categorized 
as needy and the pricing response to outside subsidies. The 
RD design only identifies the reduced form impact of these 
two dimensions, and for RD estimates, schools’ willingness 
to pay dominates their ability to capture outside aid. Using 
the combined RD/RK approach, I estimate that less than 
one-third of Pell Grant recipients benefit from these transfers, 
since schools’ ability to capture Pell Grant aid quickly over-
takes their willingness to pay for needy students. Although 
the Pell Grant program provides an especially stark example 
of how a multidimensional treatment affects RD estimates, 
in other circumstances where both a discontinuity and a kink 
are present, my results suggest that additional information 
can potentially be gained from using a combined RD/RK 
approach.
Finally, this chapter provides insight into the industrial 
organization of higher education. I show how schools’ 
responses to Pell Grant aid illustrate differences in schools’ 
objectives and market power across sectors. Only public 
institutions demonstrate a positive willingness to pay for Pell 
Grant recipients. Overall, selective nonprofit institutions cap-
ture close to 80 percent of their students’ Pell Grants. Across 
different student demographic groups, I estimate a similar 
degree of capture students attending selective nonprofits, 
suggesting that these schools’ extensive ability to appropri-
ate Pell Grant aid stems from a greater degree of market 
power rather than differences in student demand. Finally, I 
find no evidence that for-profit institutions behave differently 
from other nonselective schools in the private sector in their 
response to Pell Grant aid, and combined, schools in this sec-
tor capture just 18 percent of their students’ Pell Grant aid.
Chapter 2 
The Returns to Higher Education for  
Marginal Students
The second chapter of my dissertation examines whether 
government programs providing financial support to low-
income families should explicitly support or deny access to 
higher education. I estimate the impact of college credits 
and credentials on the labor market outcomes of several 
cohorts of current and former welfare recipients in Colorado. 
I use an event-study approach to control for time-invariant 
individual characteristics, such as differences in ability 
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and motivation. Women who are induced to attend col-
lege after entering welfare experience large and significant 
earnings gains; however, these returns are driven by creden-
tial receipt, and when sub–associate’s degree credentials are 
unobservable, positive earnings gains will be inappropriately 
attributed to college attendance alone.
Public two-year colleges serve an increasingly important 
role in meeting the growing demand for an educated work-
force in the United States. The two-year sector of higher 
education absorbed much of the growth in college attendance 
over the past several decades, and students induced to go to 
college by changes in the costs or returns to higher educa-
tion are more likely to attend a two-year institution (Bound, 
Lovenheim, and Turner 2010). Numerous studies provide 
evidence of substantial labor market returns to community 
college credits and credentials, with estimated earnings gains 
as high as 13 percent for each year of attendance and 30 per-
cent for associate’s degree receipt (e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde, 
and Sullivan 2005; Kane and Rouse 1995). However, the 
marginal individual induced to enter college by changes in 
costs or returns may differ substantially from the average 
college student, and it is unclear whether these individuals 
will experience equally large returns from attending a two-
year institution.
In this chapter, I focus on a group of students in Colo-
rado who are likely especially constrained in their ability 
to finance college attendance—mothers who are current 
and former welfare recipients. Mothers at risk for welfare 
receipt are a n  especially relevant group given their gener-
ally low levels of income, education, and limits on lifetime 
cash assistance. Using information on earnings trajectories 
before and following entry into Colorado’s welfare program 
and taking advantage of variation in preexisting county poli-
cies that affect the cost of college-going for several cohorts 
of women, I estimate medium-term impacts of community 
college attendance, credits, and credential receipt on employ-
ment and earnings.
I find that women who are induced to attend college 
following welfare entry experience large and significant 
earnings gains; however, these effects are primarily driven 
by credential receipt. Women appear to benefit from all com-
munity college credentials, including short-term certificates 
and career-oriented associate’s degrees; the only exceptions 
to this finding are associate’s of arts or general studies 
degrees. These credentials, while potentially facilitating 
transfers to a four-year program, do not appear to lead to 
increases in employment or earnings alone.
My identification strategy uses an event-study framework 
to deal with concerns of selection bias. If college-going 
women only differ in unobservable characteristics, such as 
ability or motivation, these estimates will represent the 
causal impact of higher education on labor market out-
comes. Consistent with prior studies, my results suggest that 
women earning degrees in health, science, or technical fields 
experience the largest benefits in the labor market, but even 
those who earn short-term certificates in nontechnical fields 
experience an increase in earnings following degree receipt. I 
document that failure to account for sub-associate’s creden-
tials results in falsely attributing positive earnings gains to 
college attendance in the absence of degree receipt. Mea-
sures of educational attainment in most major surveys (e.g., 
decennial census, Current Population Survey) do not include 
certificate receipt, suggesting that the large category gener-
ally classified as “some college” includes a heterogeneous 
group of individuals.
Finally, I use information on direct and indirect costs of 
college attendance and reliance on public assistance to illus-
trate the potential short-run private and social returns college 
attendance. In the short-run, when foregone earnings 
and the direct costs of college attendance are taken into 
consideration, the private rate of return to certificates and 
most degrees is negative, providing a rationale as to why so 
few women complete credentials, even in light of the large 
impacts on earnings in the medium term. I also find sugges-
tive evidence of small negative (albeit marginally significant) 
impacts on welfare receipt in the short run.
My findings speak to the question of whether state and 
federal welfare policy should support formal human capital 
development. Both the Obama administration and the Gates 
Foundation have directed substantial attention and funds 
toward community college. Additionally, community college 
students are more likely to benefit from increases in federal 
aid generosity. Grant aid provided through the Pell Grant 
Program, the largest source of need-based aid in the United 
States, grew from $7.2 billion to $30 billion between 2000 
and 2010, with the percentage of recipients attending com-
munity colleges increasing from 36 to 57 percent. My results 
suggest that supports for credential completion are as impor-
tant, if not more so, than funding directed toward increasing 
college attendance.
Chapter 3
The Design of Teacher Incentive Pay and 
Educational Outcomes
The final chapter of my dissertation, written jointly with 
Sarena Goodman, addresses the question of how to effi-
ciently provide education at the primary and secondary 
levels. In many sectors, performance-based pay enhances 
effort, output, and other desirable outcomes. Evidence from 
Israel and India suggests that properly structured teacher 
incentive pay programs can benefit students (Lavy 2002, 
2009; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011). However, 
in the United States, teacher compensation schemes are 
often criticized for lacking a performance-based compo-
nent. Proponents argue that teacher incentive pay can raise 
student achievement and stimulate systemwide innovation. 
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In this chapter, we examine a group-based teacher incen-
tive scheme implemented in New York City and investigate 
whether specific features of the program contributed to its 
ineffectiveness.
We provide suggestive evidence that the group-based 
structure of the program may have been detrimental in the 
majority of schools where the number of teachers respon-
sible for tested students is large. Conversely, the program 
improved math achievement in schools with fewer teachers 
responsible for tested students or a more cohesive group of 
teachers. A lack of monitoring as well as the diffusion of 
responsibility for test score gains among many teachers 
may have diluted the incentives of the opportunity to earn 
bonuses. Our results are consistent with the long-standing 
literature in economics on the importance of taking into 
consideration free-riding, joint production, and monitoring 
when designing incentive systems and suggest that a one-
size-fits-all approach may not be the most effective when 
implementing incentive pay schemes within a school district.
Currently, the U.S. government provides significant fund-
ing through the Race to the Top program. Eligibility for Race 
to the Top funding depends on districts’ ability and will-
ingness to link student achievement to individual teach-
ers and use this data in teacher evaluations, but grants 
districts a great deal of discretion in designing performance 
pay systems. In 2010, 62 school districts and nonprofit 
groups received over $400 million in funding from the 
federal Teacher Incentive Fund. Our results underscore the 
importance of the structure of performance pay in education. 
Policy innovations in this area should be carefully consid-
ered, taking into account personnel economics theory and 
research.
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